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Abstract
The International Health Regulations (IHR), an international law under the auspices of the World 
Health Organization (WHO), mandates that countries notify other countries of “travelers under 
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public health observation.” Between November 10, 2014, and July 12, 2015, the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) made 2,374 notifications to the National IHR Focal Points 
in 114 foreign countries of travelers who were monitored by US health departments because they 
had been to an Ebola-affected country in West Africa. Given that countries have preidentified focal 
points as points of contacts for sharing of public health information, notifications could be made 
by CDC to a trusted public health recipient in another country within 24 hours of receipt of the 
traveler’s information from a US health department. The majority of US health departments used 
this process, offered by CDC, to notify other countries of travelers intending to leave the United 
States while being monitored in their jurisdiction.
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The 2014–15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa is the largest Ebola virus disease (EVD) 
outbreak ever recorded. Historically, approximately 150 travelers arrive daily in the United 
States from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the 3 countries most heavily affected by the 
2014 Ebola outbreak. To provide these travelers with information about EVD, assess their 
specific exposure risk and potential signs and symptoms of EVD, and enable domestic 
public health monitoring of travelers for up to 21 days post-departure from the affected 
countries,1 in October 2014, the United States implemented enhanced risk assessment and 
management at points of entry for travelers arriving from Ebola-affected countries. This 
included people without a specific risk exposure other than having been in a country with 
widespread transmission.2 Accordingly, all travelers arriving from an Ebola-affected country 
were monitored daily by health departments with jurisdiction over the traveler’s location. 
Daily monitoring generally consisted of temperature measurement and symptom reporting to 
the respective health department.
Upon entry into the United States and further assessment by receiving health departments, 
travelers from Ebola-affected countries were categorized in 1 of 3 exposure risk categories: 
high-risk, some-risk, and low-but-not-zero-risk. Per guidance from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), asymptomatic travelers in the “low-but-not-zero-risk” 
category were permitted to travel domestically or internationally while being monitored, as 
they were not ill or infectious or at risk of imminently becoming ill or infectious. Based on 
the respective health department’s discretion, and in consultation with CDC, asymptomatic 
travelers in the “some-risk” category were also permitted to travel.3 The programs for 
screening and tracking travelers have been described in more detail elsewhere.4,5
To enable uninterrupted monitoring, travelers were asked to provide information about travel 
plans during the monitoring period. CDC, together with state and local health departments, 
devised a process for domestic and international notifications. To enable ongoing monitoring 
per US policy during domestic travel, the health departments that were responsible for the 
daily monitoring of the traveler until departure from their jurisdiction shared the traveler’s 
contact information directly with the receiving health department. For international travel, 
CDC offered to notify the country of final destination for travelers leaving the United States 
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during the 21-day monitoring period; specifically, CDC informed a country’s National IHR 
Focal Point. National IHR Focal Points are points of contact designated by each of the 196 
countries that are states parties to the International Health Regulations (IHR) and should 
always be accessible for IHR-related information exchange with WHO and other national 
focal points. CDC obtained the contact information for national focal points from the WHO 
secure website for IHR, having received permission from the US national focal point at the 
Department of Health and Human Services to share public health information directly with 
other countries’ National IHR Focal Points. The IHR, an international law under the 
auspices of WHO, fosters rapid and transparent exchange of public health information and, 
specifically, requires countries to inform other countries of travelers under public health 
observation who are arriving in their jurisdiction.6
Here we report on the process and implementation of the international notifications by CDC 
to other countries receiving travelers under monitoring for EVD during the week of 
November 10, 2014, through the week of July 6, 2015. This timeframe begins on the date 
when the first international notification was made using a standardized format and extends to 
the date when the last person, arriving from Liberia, completed the post-departure 
monitoring period in the United States following the first WHO declaration of Liberia being 
Ebola-free. During this time-frame, there were 20,893 travelers who arrived in the United 
States within 21 days post-departure from an Ebola-affected country; between 1,331 and 
2,719 travelers were under post-departure monitoring by US health departments during any 
given week.
Process for International Notifications
On November 13, 2014, CDC sent an informational letter via its secure web-based 
communication system, the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X),7 to key contacts at 
state and local health departments. The letter described the process for sending international 
travel notifications for travelers under monitoring in their jurisdictions who intended to 
depart the United States during the 21-day monitoring period. It provided information on the 
purpose of sharing travelers’ information with the country of final destination; requested 
information from the traveler included intended destination, dates of travel, personal 
identifying information, the date of last exposure, and the end of the monitoring period, as 
well as contact information for the US health department with current jurisdiction for the 
traveler. Information was to be sent by email, in password-protected portable document 
format (PDF), to a CDC functional mailbox. Health departments were further asked to 
encourage travelers to reach out to the destination country, or its embassy, to understand 
potential travel restrictions. Updates on the international notification process were sent to 
health departments on December 18, 2014, and February 3, 2015.
Within 24 hours of receiving a request for an international travel notification, CDC emailed 
a password-protected PDF to the National IHR Focal Point of the country of intended final 
destination. The information shared included the traveler’s name, age, gender, exposure risk 
category, the point in the 21-day monitoring period on the anticipated date of departure, and 
the calculated last date of monitoring based on the last day of presence in an Ebola-affected 
country, if this information was available from the health department. Information on actual 
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flight itineraries was not collected from the travelers. If a traveler went to a protectorate or 
territory of a foreign country, the national focal point for that country was notified. Further, 
Mexico and Canada, as the 2 US neighbors with frequent travel and regular exchange of 
information, including attempts to harmonize public health responses, requested additional 
points of contact be notified to enable continuity of monitoring. Acknowledgment of receipt 
of the information was not requested by CDC from any of the National IHR Focal Points.
International travel notifications were also made for travelers who transited through the 
United States from one of the Ebola-affected countries to a third country. Because those 
travelers never entered a US public health jurisdiction, information was sent directly to 
CDC’s functional mailbox for international travel notifications by the data management 
team responsible for processing information received from travelers during the entry 
screening process at the US point of entry.
Implementation of International Notifications
CDC made its first notification to another country’s National IHR Focal Point on November 
14, 2014. Between November 14, 2014, and July 12, 2015, CDC issued 2,374 notifications 
from 42 different US public health jurisdictions to National IHR Focal Points in 114 
countries. During the same 8 months, US public health departments listed 2,711 travelers as 
having left the United States during the monitoring period. Notifications by US public health 
jurisdictions for travelers under monitoring ranged from 1 notification each submitted by 3 
jurisdictions to 688 notifications submitted by New York City. Notifications to other 
countries’ national focal points ranged from 1 notification each sent to 25 countries to 574 
notifications sent to Liberia (see Figure 1). Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone accounted for 
almost half (49%) of all notifications sent, while 23% of notifications were made to National 
IHR Focal Point in Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. A total of 89 
notifications to 26 National IHR Focal Points (including 34 to Canada) were made for 
travelers in transit through the United States after they underwent screening and risk 
assessment at the port of entry. In 4 instances, notifications were made to the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom for a Caribbean island under their authority. Requests for 
notifications from or to US territories to other US public health jurisdictions were not 
included in our data.
The number of notifications to CDC by a US public health jurisdiction of travelers intending 
to leave the United States was proportionate to the number of travelers who arrived in, or 
were monitored by, that jurisdiction, and was offset by 1 to 2 weeks after their arrival in that 
jurisdiction. Proportionate to the number of travelers under monitoring in any given week, 
more notifications were made the weeks of December 29, 2014, and January 5, 2015 (5.8% 
of all travelers under monitoring), the week of April 20, 2015 (7.2%), and the week of July 
6, 2015 (8.1%) (see Figure 2); the dates approximate the winter, spring, and summer 
holidays in the United States.
Based on information provided to CDC as part of the notification request from health 
departments, all notifications were for travelers in the “low-but-not-zero-risk” category. The 
last day of screening by a US public health department on the date of anticipated departure 
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was available for 2,121 (89%) of the 2,374 notifications; the date when the 21-day 
monitoring period would end was available for 2,241 (94%) notifications. Both dates were 
available for 2,036 (85%) notifications. Accordingly, the calculated range for the remaining 
days of the 21-day monitoring period after anticipated departure from the United States was 
0 to 21 days, with a median of 11 days, and with 7 days left for 27% of travelers. The 
majority of notification requests from public health jurisdictions (1,660 [74%] of 2,241 for 
which this information was available) did not specify a plan for monitoring after the traveler 
left the United States; 467 (20%) planned to turn the monitoring over to the receiving 
country, 89 (4%) planned to continue monitoring themselves, and 25 (1%) recommended 
self-monitoring without requesting follow-up with the health department.
Of the 2,374 notifications sent, CDC received approximately 281 (12%) responses from 41 
countries; 216 (76%) responses were acknowledgment receipts, including 167 (59.4%) from 
Canada. Responses received also included requests for information on flight numbers and 
local destination by 18 countries; there were also 26 requests for additional information 
about the type of exposure to Ebola, the country of exposure, and other aspects of exposures, 
and 7 requests for missing passwords or attachments or for assistance in opening the 
password-protected file. One national focal point was unable to receive the attachment 
through the country’s firewall, and it was subsequently, per request, sent to a different email 
address. Nine National IHR Focal Points replied with their plans for continued monitoring, 2 
reported that they were not able to locate the traveler in the country of arrival, and 2 
responded to the notification with a request to advise the traveler not to travel, as they would 
not be allowed to enter. On at least one occasion, the National IHR Focal Point was 
concerned that the traveler had arrived prior to the notification and requested that this not 
recur. In 7 instances, CDC became aware that the National IHR Focal Point and their 
ministries of health had refused entry to a traveler to their country upon arrival or imposed 
quarantine per their response protocols; CDC and other US government and international 
public health agencies, including the WHO, worked with the respective countries to 
facilitate a resolution for these travelers.
Discussion
Notifications to other countries of travelers arriving in their jurisdiction who have potentially 
been exposed to an infectious disease are standard practice in the global public health 
community, and, if the traveler is under public health observation and allowed to travel, such 
notifications are mandated under the IHR. International notifications were given for up to 
8% of people under monitoring for EVD in the United States in a given week. In previous 
contact investigations of travelers possibly exposed to an infectious disease on an 
international flight, we have seen that up to 25% of these travelers leave the United States 
again within 1 to 2 weeks of arrival (Susan Lippold, personal communication). The 
proportion of travelers from Ebola-affected countries for whom international notifications 
were made because of their departure during the 21-day monitoring period is well within 
this range. Several other countries, most notably Canada and the United Kingdom, deployed 
the same practice of alerting CDC of travelers to the United States who were under 
monitoring in that country. We also had an explicit agreement with Canada and Mexico for 
rapid information exchange and harmonized risk assessments and monitoring practices.
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Travelers frequently alerted the health department of travel plans just shortly before planned 
travel (eg, during the last direct monitoring encounter). This might be because travelers for 
whom international notifications were made were unrestricted in domestic or international 
travel, per CDC guidance, and the obligation of the traveler to the health department with 
jurisdiction over the 21-day monitoring period was to assure ongoing monitoring while in 
the respective public health jurisdiction. Because of a potential time lag and the time zone 
differences between notification of CDC by health departments of a departing traveler and 
then onward notification to the country of destination, some international travel notifications 
were received by the destination country after the traveler had already arrived at their final 
destination. This was particularly true for those travelers who only transited through the 
United States. Regardless of the final destination, processing time for the screening 
information at the port of entry to generate the international notification was necessary. 
Several countries would have preferred to receive at least several days’ advance notice.
More specific information on travel itineraries and exposure details was requested by some 
National IHR Focal Points. Because the monitoring program was a domestic program and 
those travelers were unrestricted in their movement, there was concern that that level of 
inquiry was not warranted and could not have been legally enforced. However, CDC stressed 
to the health departments and travelers the importance of contacting the embassy or ministry 
of health of the receiving country prior to travel to learn what movement restrictions to 
expect on arrival. We also checked information regularly compiled by WHO on health 
measures that might “significantly interfere with international traffic” and that were in 
addition to health measures recommended by WHO in response to the Ebola outbreak8 in 
order to be able to convey this to health departments who were in contact with the travelers. 
Additionally, the notification to countries included contact information for the US public 
health department that had last performed monitoring for the traveler so that additional 
information could be requested. It also included a request to countries to inform us of 
potential restrictions on travelers. Anecdotally, we learned that several travelers were able to 
adjust their travel plans based on the information received.
We did not compare personal identifiers of those leaving from a given public health 
jurisdiction with those under monitoring in that jurisdiction; however, we think there is 
sufficient information to suggest that appropriate international notifications were made for 
most travelers under monitoring. First, when comparing the number of travelers reported as 
leaving the United States during the monitoring period by health departments with the 
number of international notifications made, we calculate that CDC made notifications for 
89% of travelers. Second, exceedingly few travelers (range 0.03%-1.4%, median 0.4%) were 
lost to follow up in the United States during the 21-day monitoring period.9 Third, 41 of 60 
health departments that ever had a traveler under monitoring informed CDC of travelers 
leaving the United States during the monitoring period. Fourth, although notification through 
CDC was voluntary, the first request to CDC for an international notification was made 
within a day of the informational letter posted to health departments on Epi-X.
We did not formally assess the acceptability and ease of implementation of the international 
notification process. However, anecdotally, we learned of concerns by a limited number of 
health departments early in the implementation phase of the program; for example, there 
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were concerns about notifying countries with more restrictive quarantine policies, as well as 
for travelers the health department intended to continue to monitor following their departure 
from the United States. Some health departments had different legal requirements for 
sharing the requested information in order to assure the protection of the traveler’s privacy. 
In such cases, information could be shared by phone or secure fax. At CDC, design and 
implementation of the process was part of the ongoing response efforts; the actual 
notification and information exchange with national focal points was estimated to having 
been 1 person’s full-time effort.
We also did not formally follow up with countries about their perception and acceptance of 
the US notifications. However, we learned informally that several travelers encountered 
difficulty entering their destination country. Specifically, we became aware of 7 instances in 
which travelers were quarantined or restricted from entering the country. Efforts to mitigate 
this interruption to a traveler’s plans were sometimes successful, working in close 
collaboration with WHO and the respective ministry of health to further explain the “low-
but-not-zero” risk level of such travelers.
Given the novelty of the entry screening risk assessment, coupled with the post-arrival 
monitoring program for travelers from an Ebola-affected country, CDC quickly implemented 
an international notification process commensurate with the exposure risk of the travelers 
and their right to privacy. This was accomplished within the context of changing policies for 
border measures in receiving countries and an obligation under Article 30 of the IHR to 
share information on “persons under observation” leaving our jurisdiction. Overall, the first 
8 months of this process, which included the peak of the Ebola epidemic, provide a good 
example of the close collaboration needed from the local to the international public health 
level when responding to potential threats to public health.
CDC rapidly implemented a process by which state and local health departments could share 
traveler information with CDC of notifications of other countries about the pending arrival 
of travelers under monitoring for EVD. This process has been used successfully by the US 
public health jurisdictions and CDC more than 2,000 times during an 8-month period, which 
demonstrates the ability of the public health system to creatively address the ever-increasing 
challenges of global health security. The designation of the National IHR Focal Points, 
mandated to states parties by the IHR, was essential for these informal notifications. 
Implementing this voluntary but systematic process for making international notifications of 
travelers under public health observation during a global public health crisis allowed the 
United States to fulfill its IHR obligations and is the only means by which a receiving 
country can protect its citizens against the introduction of an infectious disease within its 
own parameters of risk tolerance and public health infrastructure.
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International Notifications for Persons Intending to Leave the United States During 21-Day 
Monitoring for Ebola
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Proportion of Number of International Notifications Over Number of Persons Under 21-Day 
Monitoring for Ebola by Monitoring Week, November 10, 2014–July 12, 2015
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